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I. INTRODUCTION
When this panel was originally conceived, we could not have
anticipated the extent to which the limits of international law would have to
be stretched by events in the city where our conference would be held.
Our thinking about the pace and nature of changes shifting the boundaries
of international law have had to be radically revised and the aftermath of
September l1th has necessarily prompted a significant change in the
thinking about the limits of international law. In the place of the sense of
confidence in the consistent deepening of globalization, and the attendant
web of international legal frameworks for the regulation of transnational
activity, we are confronted with a sudden pessimism of the impotence of
law in the face of violence. Rather than taking up the question of evolving
practices of inclusion in and exclusion from international participation, as I
had originally intended, I will focus my discussion on the available
paradigms through which we might understand the spectrum of
international options in responding to the attacks of September 11th.' This
* J.D., Yale Law School, 1999; M.P.A., Princeton University, 1999; M.Phil.,
University of Cambridge, 1995; B.A. Williams College, 1993. These remarks were presented at
the International Law Association ILA Weekend, October 2001, New York, New York, United
States.
1. There is a subtle relationship between this question and the original subject of my
remarks, but the constraints of the presentation on which these remarks are based did not allow
more than an allusion to this link. Practices of inclusion in and exclusion from international
participation-by which I mean formal mechanisms of recognition and accession to international
legal regimes, as well as informal mechanisms for the entry into or exclusion from regular
channels of inter-state transactions-can also be described as strategies of engagement or
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subject requires a somewhat more prescriptive approach than legal
academics are in the habit of adopting. However, the urgency of the
current international crisis, and the convergence of policy and legal
approaches on the question of designing new mechanisms to counter
terrorism, warrants stepping out of character.
The first question to which we must turn our attention in asking how
to wage the battle against terrorism is whether we are best served by
conceptualizing the attacks as criminal acts or acts of war.2 While there
containment. The classic mechanism of inclusion is the entry into diplomatic relations. The
classic mechanism of exclusion is the withholding of recognition or the imposition of sanctions.
Between these examples, there is a wide array of practices of inclusion and exclusion that may be
considered. Recent trends in American foreign policy, including the use of unilateral and
multilateral sanctions, has given rise to the question whether the formal mechanisms of
membership in the international community (recognition as a declaratory statement that an entity
meets the objective test of statehood through effective control of its territory) are being displaced
by the development of normative or quasi-normative criteria governing inclusion in and exclusion
of states from participation in a variety of international fora. For an example of the definition of
this "objective test," see the Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, art.
1, 49 Stat. 3097, 3099, 165 L.N.T.S. 19, 21 (providing that "[t]he State as a person of
international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a
defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with other States.").
The question, when we turn our attention to developing responses under international law
to the threat of terrorism, is whether there is any effective 'means of "containing" terrorism
through exclusionary practices whereby states are subjected to coercive intervention. As I will
suggest below, treating terrorism as an international crime, and attacks of the kind witnessed on
September 1 1th as massive crimes against humanity, would permit the invocation of principles of
universal jurisdiction in the pursuit of those responsible for such acts, wherever they may be
located. Under such a conception, states may be engaged through a series of international legal
obligations in a transnational effort to pursue, prosecute and punish terrorists found within their
territory, with appropriate sanctions associated with the failure to do so. For a discussion of
proposed principles for the implementation of universal jurisdiction through national courts, see
STEPHEN MACEDO, THE PRINCETON PROJECT ON UNIVERSAL JURSIDICTION, THE PRINCETON
PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION (2001). In contrast, to treat acts of international
terrorism as acts of war authorizing the use of force against territories from which terrorists may
operate suggests a military paradigm for countering the threat of terrorist violence. Where the
use of force encompasses not only those responsible for terrorist acts, but states where they may
be present (with no necessary requirement of state-sponsorship) such a strategy would contribute
to the development of exclusionary mechanisms under international law by broadening the
grounds on which states may become subject to coercive intervention. However, the
effectiveness of conventional uses of force in combating what may be a transnational
phenomenon not bound to a particular territorial base is questionable, especially when the high
costs to the international system of destabilizing military interventions and their aftermaths are
taken into consideration. I will provide principled and pragmatic arguments for the privileging of
a legalist paradigm over a military one. For the purposes of the remainder of this discussion,
however, the inclusionary or exclusionary implications of different strategies in combating
terrorism are of secondary concern, and will have to be left to be taken up elsewhere.
2. Although this has been conceived as an either/or question in most discussions of the
status of the attacks under international law, it is more accurate to say that the attacks blurred the
lines between criminal acts and acts of war. The question remains, however, whether the
appropriate response to the attacks should draw more on the resources in international law to
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are strong arguments for both paradigms, when viewed from the
perspective of fashioning an effective, long-term strategy for countering
international terrorism, I will argue that drawing on international criminal
law is the more promising avenue of response. In particular, I will make
the case that adopting a politico-military approach rather than a legalist
paradigm undermines the effectiveness of international law, in ways
dangerous to international order, and potentially detrimental to efforts to
prevent and punish acts of terrorism. In the third section of this essay, I
will turn to the question of the resources already available in international
law, and the ways that the boundaries of international law may be shifted,
to address terrorism.
II. Two PARADIGMS FOR AN INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO
TERRORISM: POLITICO-MILITARY AND INTERNATIONAL-LEGALIST
While the September l1th attacks were an unprecedented form of
international terrorism, international law is not without resources for
developing an appropriate and effective response. International law, like
all bodies of law, develops through the application of precedents to like
cases, or the adaptation of precedents to suit new circumstances by way of
extrapolation and analogy. There are two relevant precedents for
considering how an international response to massive terrorist attacks may
be fashioned in the wake of the September 1lth attacks. The first is the
Nuremberg war crimes tribunal,, and the international legalist paradigm
address transnational crime or whether there should be a reliance on the use of force. This is the
question that I mean to evoke here, and not the diversionary debate over the fit between the
attacks and pre-existing conceptions of terrorism and war. See also infra note 7.
3. One challenge to the applicability of the Nuremberg precedent and the developing
practice of international criminal tribunals in this context is that in each case these tribunals have
been convened in the aftermath of a war or crime against humanity. According to this reasoning,
the use of international tribunals cannot be relevant until the conclusion of the military campaign
against the particular terrorist organization or network implicated in the September 11 th attacks.
But this argument presumes the necessity of undertaking military action in response to the attacks
and subordinates the use of an international tribunal to a secondary and subsequent phase of
response. If, however, the convening of an international criminal tribunal were considered as an
alternative to a military approach, this objection ceases to be relevant. That is, if the attacks of
September llth were conceptualized as a crime against humanity, then the convening of the
tribunal would clearly be subsequent to the crime, and thus the timing objection would have been
met.
Aside from this timing objection, however, there are at least three other disadvantages that
may be cited to convening international tribunals to prosecute terrorists for crimes against
humanity: 1) the difficulty of apprehending the perpetrators; 2) the inadequacy of international
criminal law to the task of deterring transnational crime; and 3) the risk of acquittal.
The first two objections are pragmatic, and as a matter of practical urgency, will be
resolved. In the first case, transnational efforts to develop an international policing capacity,
through the United Nations or through a specific, separate multilateral framework, are long
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that developed out of that precedent, leading to the creation of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (the "ICTY"),'4
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (the "ICTR"),' and
ultimately the drafting of the statute for the International Criminal Court
(the "ICC").6 The other is the Kosovo War of 1999, with the political and
military paradigm of a coalition that represents a subset of the international
community and that operates outside of a United Nations framework to
undertake an enforcement action in response to aggression or crimes
overdue. In response to the second objection, one can readily point to the tremendous
acceleration in the formulation of international criminal law over the last decade. The particular
objection in this instance could be overcome by the convening of an ad hoc tribunal, the statute
of which would provide all of the relevant legal grounds necessary for prosecution. I discuss this
option below. Beyond this, the deterrence debate is one intrinsic to all instances of criminal
prosecution, whether domestic or international. While no application of law can fully deter
extremism, raising the costs of sponsoring or facilitating terrorist acts will serve as an important
deterrent to state sponsorship. A full discussion of the deterrent value of a legalist paradigm,
with all of its complexity, is beyond the scope of this essay. For one thorough analysis of the
question of deterrence in applications of international criminal law, see JUDITH SHKLAR,
LEGALISM (1964).
As for the third objection, it seems misplaced. In the past, international criminal tribunals,
including the Nuremberg tribunal, have issued a (quite limited) number of acquittals. In light of
the magnitude of the crimes against humanity in question at Nuremberg, and in the ICTY and the
ICTR, if the risk of acquittal was deemed acceptable in these cases (and in the cases of the latter
two tribunals, they were convened in the absence of the "total" military defeat of the parties
accused of the crimes), then it is difficult to imagine the distinct principled or pragmatic
argument against permitting the possibility of acquittal in the case of trials of alleged terrorists.
After all, the possibility of the innocence of at least some persons brought before such a tribunal
cannot be excluded.
4. This is the official abbreviated title for the Tribunal. See U.N. Press Release, No.
IT/13, Nov. 30, 1993, and No. IT/30, Feb. 11, 1994. The full title of the ICTY is the
International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since
1991. For the Security Council resolution establishing the ICTY, see U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/827 (1993).
5. The full title of the ICTR is the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of
Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian
Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and
Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States Between 1 January and
31 December 1994. For the Security Council resolution establishing the ICTR, see S. Res. 955,
U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994).
6. The Statute for the International Criminal Court was drafted at the United Nations
Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court [hereinafter, "U.N. Diplomatic Conf. of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an
ICC"] held in Rome, Italy (1998). See Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N.
Diplomatic Conf. of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an ICC, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 183/9 (1998).
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against humanity.7 I will consider the former to represent the international
legalist tradition, and the latter a politico-military approach.
7. By "Kosovo war" I am referring to the eleven-week bombing campaign conducted by
NATO against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, beginning on March 24, 1999. This
campaign was designated "Operation Allied Force" and had many unique features worth bearing
in mind. Most importantly, the Kosovo war may represent a precedent for expanding the
international legal basis for the use of force. As at least one international legal scholar has noted,
Operation Allied Force represented "the first time a major use of destructive armed force had
been undertaken with the stated purpose of implementing UN Security Council resolutions but
without Security Council authorization." Adam Roberts, NATO's 'Humanitarian War' Over
Kosovo, 41(3) SURVIVAL 102, 102 (1999).
In this sense, this is a more pertinent example than the common references to the Pearl
Harbor attack as the relevant precedent for a military response. Where the Pearl Harbor attack
had all of the features of a conventional form of state aggression (on the part of Japan) giving rise
to a straightforward right of self-defense on the part of the victim of that aggression (the U.S.).
The bombing campaign against Afghanistan by Anglo-American forces-initially dubbed
'Operation Infinite Justice,' but later renamed 'Operation Enduring Freedom'-which began on
October 7, 2001, resembles the Kosovo campaign in that it does not enjoy direct Security
Council authorization, though two resolutions in September express the United Nations's support
for efforts to combat terrorism.
In the case of the air campaign against Afghanistan, the American representative to the
United Nations, Ambassador John Negroponte, presented a letter to the Security Council on
October 8, 2001 stating that the attacks against Afghanistan were acts of self-defense under
Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. See Christopher Wren, U.S. Advises U.N.
Council More Strikes Could Come, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2001, at B5. Absent evidence
establishing state sponsorship on the part of Afghanistan of the attacks of September 11th, this
invocation of the right of self-defense reflects an expansive interpretation of the Article 51. In
particular, while Article 51 recognizes an "inherent right of individual or collective self-defence
[sic] if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations" it has not previously
been interpreted to permit uses of force against a state not held directly responsible for the attack
in question. See U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
Thus the question arises whether the right of self-defense extends to attacks on states on
whose territory non-state actors believed to be responsible for an armed attack may be present.
Some international jurists have argued that the unprecedented nature of the September lth
attacks combined with the apparent absence of a direct state-sponsor require a broadening of the
United Nation Charter's authorization of the use of force to cover actions like Operation
Enduring Freedom, and future uses of military force to attack terrorists wherever they may be
located. See, e.g., Richard Falk, Falk Replies, THE NATION, Nov. 26, 2001, at 2. Such a
broadened definition of the justified use of force would only be necessary if it could be
established that the nature of the threat is of a continuous, military onslaught by an organization
or network with access to military technologies.
What the attacks of September 1 1th have so far proved is the ability of non-state actors to
hijack civilian technologies and use them in acts of political violence. Hijacking itself is not, of
course, a new phenomenon, and it is a phenomenon that has been defined in the past as an
instance of transnational crime, which has largely been deterred or prevented through national
security precautions and international coordination. Whether hijacking coupled with the use of
the hijacked planes to attack civilian or military targets transforms the criminal act into an act of
war depends on a definitional question requiring the adaptation of existing definitions to these
circumstances, as there is no clear precedent. The September l1th attacks constitute a blurring
of the line between criminal acts and acts of war in a way that challenges pre-existing
international legal categorizations, and accordingly challenges international lawyers to fashion
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The international legal community has been somewhat disabled in
formulating an adequate account of what a response in the first tradition
might be. On September 1lth, it would seem, from this perspective, that
we reached the limits of international law. Events overtook theory and as
the military attacks on Afghanistan began, consideration of international
legal mechanisms became moot. Despite the apparent current pessimism
regarding the adequacy of legal mechanisms, considerable resources are
available in the international legal arsenal to formulate an adequate non-
military response. Further, military action may have unfortunate
international legal consequences, establishing new norms with problematic
implications and undermining the perceived legitimacy behind subsequent
efforts at a legalist response in the wake of a military campaign.
The attacks of September 1 1th were widely seen by media
commentators and international legal scholars alike as demonstrating a
series of deficiencies in international law. These include, but are not
limited to:
* the absence of a comprehensive international legal framework to
address terrorism;
* the absence of adequate international criminal law infrastructure
to address massive crimes against humanity and/or acts of war,
particularly by non-state actors;
* the absence of sufficient international legal mechanisms for
regulating, monitoring, prosecuting, and punishing non-state actors;
and
* the absence of international policing capacities and adequate
cooperative arrangements to undertake intelligence gathering and
crime prevention at the international or multilateral level.
The response of the international legal community to these
deficiencies in the immediate aftermath of September 11 th has been a
woeful retreat from the earlier trend of increasing the range of issues
brought within the purview of international law. 8
new categories, drawing by analogy on our existing taxonomy. The debate, then, should not be
whether the attacks were criminal or military in nature, but rather whether the international
response should draw more heavily on existing resources for international crime prevention or
for authorizing uses of force. I will come to this question below.
8. This retreat reflects the view, supported by the deficiencies listed above, that the
severity of the threat posed by international terrorism dooms the legalist paradigm to irrelevance.
See, e.g., Falk, supra note 7. However, many facets of the present multilateral efforts, beyond
the military campaign against Afghanistan, reflect a tacit reliance on the legalist paradigm, in the
form of international cooperation in intelligence-gathering, policing, law enforcement, and the
prosecution of suspected terrorists. See, e.g., Elisabeth Bumiller, Spain to Study U.S. Requests
to Extradite Terror Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2001, at B4. The question remains whether
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Yet avenues of response to the challenge of terrorist crimes against
humanity had already been proposed and developed during the 1990s by
the Sixth (or Legal) Committee of the United Nations General Assembly
("Legal Committee") to suggest an international legal framework within
which to conceptualize international responses to the present challenge.
These proposals developed in conjunction with the push to establish a
statute for an international criminal court. Even as the ICC statute was
being formulated in Rome in 1998, 9 in New York the General Assembly
("UNGA") commissioned an ad hoc committee on international terrorism
to begin drafting a new comprehensive convention on international
terrorism. The declared goal of the UNGA and its Legal Committee was
to convene a high-level conference in the year 2000 under United Nations
auspices to "formulate a joint, organized response of the international
community to terrorism in all its forms and manifestations." 1 It is perhaps
useful to note that this language would not sound out of place in describing
the goals of the United States in its efforts to form a multilateral coalition
to wage the "war on terrorism."',
The UNGA approach of 1996 onward was well suited to the nature of
the threat posed by international terrorist activities; transnational threats
require the development of a framework for coordinated international
effort. But there are two further questions to consider. First, in light of
these efforts, what international legal mechanisms are available to cope
with an attack on the scale of what was witnessed on September llth?
Second, why are such mechanisms preferable to the ad hoc military
these approaches, rather than short-term military strategy, are not the more likely to characterize
the battle against international terrorism in the long run, and if so, whether an acceleration in the
development of international law in these areas, coupled with the use of existing international
organizations (like the United Nations) to coordinate present efforts does not represent a viable
and highly relevant legalist paradigm in addressing the terrorist threat.
9. See supra note 6.
10. U.N. Doc. GA/L/3103.
11. Several commentators have noted the parallel between the metaphor of war in the
struggle against terrorism and the deployment of the same metaphor in American policies to
counter international narcotics trafficking. See, e.g., Tim Golden, A War on Terror Meets a War
on Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2001, § 4 (Week in Review), at 4. The limitations of the
metaphor in invoking the most effective mechanisms for preventing international narcotics
trafficking may be instructive in considering the prospects for success of a military effort to curb
terrorism. In particular, if the organization or network in question does not operate primarily
from a single territorial base, then the benefits of destroying particular physical infrastructure
(which in the case of a state is often devastating to its capacity to continue to pose a threat) may
have little consequence in the long-term. The problem, in dealing with transnational threats is
precisely fashioning responses that are not territorially specific, and that address the sources that
sustain the threat, which in the case of terrorism, as with narcotics trafficking, may have little to
do with physical location.
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approach now being undertaken? Let us come at this in reverse order, and
ask first what the politico-military approach has been.
The strategies in this approach have ranged from measured to
hysterical, but have largely revolved around dividing states between those
that join in an international coalition against terrorism and those that
sponsor terrorism. 2 The former are admitted into a loose military and
diplomatic alliance, while the latter are targeted for military and diplomatic
attack. The specific strategy of the military attack, at least in the early
stages against Afghanistan, was an attempt to target areas where physical
infrastructure associated with terrorist organizations or networks may have
been located. The absence of substantial terrorist infrastructure, coupled
with a frustration with the regime in power in Afghanistan, quickly led to
an expansion of the military strategy to the toppling of that regime and
support to a rival faction on the ground. In the process, collateral damage
with respect to civilian targets occurred and there may have been
substantial violations of the laws of war.'3 The expansion of the aims of
the military campaign, the strategy of dividing nations between those that
support the coalition and those that support terrorism, and the absence of
12. This strategy has been developed primarily by the Bush administration in the United
States and the government of Prime Minister Tony Blair in the United Kingdom. See, e.g.,
Elisabeth Bumiller, Prepare for Casualties, Bush Says, While Asking Support of Nation, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 20, 2001, at Al (noting that President Bush "posed a stark choice to other nations.
'Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make,' he said. 'Either you are with us, or
you are with the terrorists.'"); Nicholas Blatt and Suzanne Goldenberg, Blair Delivers the Final
Warning: Tough New Rhetoric May Signal Strike at Regime Within Week, THE GUARDIAN
(LONDON), Sept. 26, 2001, at 1. The Bush-Blair military campaign is not, of course, the only
means by which a politico-military strategy for dealing with the threat of terrorism might be
formulated. However, it is instructive that the approach they adopted required identifying state
entities that might be the legitimate target of a use of force, although no allegations of state-
sponsorship of the actual attacks of September l1th were ever issued. Accordingly, the impulse
to divide the international system between those that will join a coalition against terrorism and
those that will be targeted by it is a politically expedient policy for distinguishing appropriate
targets of attack. The absence of a connection between the states that are potential targets of the
military campaign and direct responsibility for the attacks is an indication of the poor fit between
the military strategy and the atrocity it is intended to address.
13. See, e.g., Nicholas Watt, Richard Gordon-Taylor, and Luke Harding, Allies Justify
Mass Killing, THE GUARDIAN (LONDON), Nov. 29, 2001, at 1 (noting that "Britain and the
United States were facing growing international pressure ... to explain their role in the deaths of
up to 400 Taliban prisoners who were killed by United States warplanes and Northern Alliance
fighters at a fortress outside the northern Afghan town of Mazar-i-Sharif'). Whether the
circumstances surrounding this massacre rise to the level of a violation of the Third Geneva
Convention is unclear, but other aspects of military policy have also raised concerns. See, e.g.,
Dexter Filkins and Carlotta Gall, Foreign Militants Seek Safe Passage From Afghan City, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 22, 2001, at Al (noting that United States Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
"was firmly opposed to any agreement to evacuating the foreigners" from the besieged city of
Kunduz).
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any clear allegation that the state(s) targeted by the military campaign bear
direct responsibility for the September llth attacks are all sources of
serious concern.
More generally, the politico-military response glosses over a number
of obvious difficulties, such as defining terrorism, determining how to
address different forms of terrorism (ranging from state-terrorism to
terrorism by transnational non-state actors that may or may not have state
sponsorship to terrorism by domestic groups with no international
ambitions), and developing an internationally coordinated strategy that
includes policing capabilities, intelligence gathering and sharing
arrangements, and enforcement mechanisms. Arrangements involving
sufficient international cooperation to develop effective intelligence sharing
and policing capacities have proven historically to involve enormous
obstacles, which is part of the reason that a legal framework on terrorism
has been slow in developing, as have frameworks on international narcotics
trafficking. I would argue that the only means of assuring long-term
multilateral cooperation in these areas is through an agreed, legally binding
framework.
One short-cut around developing complex mechanisms to cope with
the surveillance, policing, and enforcement capacities required to combat
non-state terrorism currently being tested is to develop criteria whereby
individual states may be penalized through existing international
mechanisms, thereby generating state-level incentives to do the dirty-work
of prevention, prosecution, and/or punishment. By attributing
responsibility to putative state sponsors, international pressure might be
brought to bear on individual states to undertake the massive intelligence
gathering, policing, and enforcement measures necessary to combat
terrorism. Thus, states that are known to have terrorist bases within their
borders, or states that appear to be involved in the financing of terrorist
networks, would bear the costs of international prevention efforts. While
this alternative seems attractive at first, and certainly underlies current
efforts to identify states that "harbor" terrorists, absent a coherent and
comprehensive legal framework this approach encounters difficulties.
First, if physical location (i.e., provision of a "harbor") is a basis for guilt-
by-association then presumably one should attribute culpability as much to
Hamburg, London, and parts of Florida, Maryland, and New Jersey, not
to mention Riyadh and Dubai, as to Kandahar. Second, if facilitating the
financing of terrorist networks is a basis for guilt then, again, it would
appear that several major Western banking groups would have to face as
much international scrutiny and pressure as Pakistan or Saudi Arabia.
What this shows is not that we should bomb Germany or dismantle major
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banking groups, but that the definitions being used are overly broad or
unsound and require precision and systematization.
Bypassing these difficulties by invocation of an us-and-them strategy
that divides the world between the coalition against terrorism and those that
allegedly sponsor terrorism is unhelpful. So long as sponsorship of the IRA
in Northern Ireland or ETA in the Basque region of Spain or the FARC in
Colombia is not at issue, the question is not a division between those that
do and do not sponsor terrorism, but rather a division between different
forms of terrorism, with different goals and different tactics. Efforts to
draw a sharp line between those that oppose and those that support
terrorism also run certain risks, not least because the civilizational
overtones of these efforts confirm the worldview of the very terrorist
groups that the coalition is seeking to combat. In light of the potential
disadvantages of the military approach, let us now to turn to an account of
the alternative legal mechanisms available for managing the threat of
international terrorism.4
III. EXTENDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Well in advance of September 11th, international jurists had begun to
undertake the monumental task of extending the boundaries of international
law to develop mechanisms to deal with transnational criminal actors,
whether terrorists, mafia, or international traffickers of illegal materials.
Viewed widely as the underside of globalization, the transnationalization of
crime and the trade in commodities previously regulated exclusively by
states (including precious minerals, drugs, and weapons of mass
destruction) requires a coordinated international legal response, involving
international policing capacities, intelligence-gathering, and prevention
work, as well as development of international criminal law to prosecute
14. I should note at the outset, however, that there are a series of legal mechanisms that
are relevant to the current crisis-especially now that it has entered the phase of actual military
action against a state-that are beyond the scope of this essay, though they are highly relevant.
These are the laws of war, both jus ad bello and more importantly jus in bello. Clearly, to the
extent that a politico-military approach is adopted, any use of force must be governed by the laws
of war-including the requirements of the Geneva Conventions and the Hague Regulations-
beginning with the principles of necessity, proportionality, and discrimination between
combatants and non-combatants. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land,
with annex of regulations, October 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277 (Hague Convention); Convention for
the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 (First Geneva Convention); Convention for the
Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 (Second Geneva Convention); Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (Third Geneva
Convention); Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (Fourth Geneva Convention).
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those accused of undertaking such crime. In the face of these realities, the
UNGA began efforts in earnest to draft a comprehensive convention
against international terrorism by the mid-1990s, parallel to the efforts to
draft a statute for a permanent international criminal court.
The first draft that emerged from these efforts was the draft
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism, which was opened for signature in January 2000, in the hopes
of having enough state signatories to have it take effect by December 31,
2001.15 The convention would make it an international crime for any
person to intentionally and unlawfully finance the commission of an act
that constitutes a terrorist offense. Terrorist offenses, in turn, were
defined not only within the convention, but also in relation to definitions in
nine other terrorism related treaties already in effect, ranging from the
criminalization of attacks on civil aviation to prohibitions on bombings.
These treaties already provide a basis for prosecution of the terrorists
behind the September 11 th attacks.16
Although the UNGA goal of convening an international conference on
terrorism has not yet been accomplished, the impetus to convene such a
conference is clearly present today. The creation of an ad hoc criminal
tribunal for September 1 lth with a statute providing a definition of
terrorism would also be an important step toward developing a
comprehensive international legal framework on terrorism.
While the favored metaphor for conceiving the September 1 lth attacks
has been that of "war" or a "military" act, the attacks challenge our
categories for conceptualizing the distinction between criminal acts and
acts of war. Nonetheless, understanding the attacks by analogy to crimes
against humanity is more constructive than the current efforts to cast the
attacks, and the response to them, militarily. Understood in terms of
15. This Convention was adopted by the General Assembly on December 9, 1999, G.A.
Res. 54/109, U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 54th Sess., U.N. Docs. A/54/607-16 (1999).
16. Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, Sept.
14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft
(Hijacking), Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Sabotage), Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564; Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons Including
Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975; International Convention against the Taking
of Hostages Dec. 17, 1979, T.I.A.S. No. 11,081, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205; Convention on the
Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, with annex, Oct. 26, 1979, T.I.A.S. No. 11,080;
Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil
Aviation, supplementary to the Convention of Sept. 23, 1971, Feb. 24, 1988, Senate Treaty
Document No. 100-19; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation, with protocol, Mar. 10, 1988, Senate Treaty Document No. 101-1;
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, Dec. 15, 1997, 37 I.L.M
249.
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crimes against humanity, the attacks immediately invoke a series of
innovative international legal remedies that we have grown accustomed to
contemplating in the last decade, including: the application of principles of
universal jurisdiction; the convening of ad hoc criminal tribunals; the
invocation of United Nations Security Council collective security powers;
and other comparable measures. These remedies have had a mixed record
of success over the course of the last decade, but they have been refined
and could be adapted to fashion an effective response in the aftermath of
the September 11 th attacks. 7
In concluding my remarks, let me identify three constructive
approaches for making use of the spectrum of relevant international law
and suggesting productive directions for legal developments that could
contribute to restoring international security in the wake of September
1 1th.
First, I would advocate the immediate adoption of the United Nations
General Assembly proposal to convene an international conference to draft
a comprehensive international convention on terrorism, based on the
UNGA Legal Committee's preliminary works." • Such a conference would
produce a working framework to coordinate international policing and
intelligence-gathering efforts that would greatly accelerate the process
already underway to identify perpetrators, their methods and their
organizational structure so as to prevent future attacks.
Second, I would propose the convening of an ad hoc criminal tribunal
(similar to the ICTY and the ICTR)' 9 for the terrorist attacks on New York
and Washington, DC. The statute of such a tribunal could establish
important precedents, including:
0 upholding a principle already being developed by the ICTR,
namely the extension of the definition of a crime against humanity in
customary international law to include crimes perpetrated by non-state
actors;
17. At least one scholar has observed that it has always been in the wake of terrorist acts
that gaps in the existing international legal frameworks have been identified and have stimulated
negotiations. See, e.g., David Freestone, The 1988 International Convention for the Suppression
of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 3 INT'L J. ESTUARINE & COASTAL
L. 305, 305-06 (1988). The same can, of course, be said for military strategy, which is also
currently being adapted to suit the purposes of a war against actors that have neither effective
control over a territory nor a regular army at their disposal.
18. See supra notes 6, 10, and 14, and accompanying text.
19. See supra notes 4, 5, and 6. It should be noted that such a tribunal need not remain in
existence once the permanent International Criminal Court is established.
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0 providing a definition of international terrorism, with a proper
carve-out for national resistance movements,2 and including a
criminal theory of conspiracy analogous to the one developed at
Nuremberg; and
* reinforcing the criminalization of the trade in controlled
substances or illegal materials, especially where used to finance
terrorist activities (a provision might be developed that would include
all black-market activities for such financing, encompassing the trade
in precious commodities like diamonds as well).
Of the mechanisms I would mention here, the final one is the
extension of the United Nations Security Council's peace and security
mandate to include threats to international peace and security emanating
from international terrorism and other actions by non-state actors or
transnational actors. The precedents set by Security Council resolutions
1368 (200 1)21 and 1373 (200 1)22 move precisely in this direction and,
particularly in the case of Resolution 1373, go a considerable distance in
defining an international legal agenda for preventing and punishing
terrorism. Specifically, 1373 envisions action under Chapter VI 3 of the
United Nations Charter to:
* prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts;
* criminalize all forms of state support to terrorist entities and
persons and assign serious criminal penalties proportionate to the
crimes;
20. An abiding difficulty in international efforts to establish a comprehensive framework
on terrorism have been definitional debates, largely centered on drawing a distinction between a
"legitimate struggle for self-determination" and terrorism. See, e.g., Press Release: Co.sensus
Eludes Legal Committee in Final Act of Session As It Recommends Blanket Condemnation of
Terrorism-Abstaining States Decry Failure to Distinguish Legitimate Struggle for Self-
determination from Terrorism, U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 54th Sess., U.N. Doc. GA/L/3140
(1999). The current international effort to combat terrorism has drawn a clear division between
non-state actors using political violence to advance self-determination claims (ETA in Spain or
the IRA in Ireland) and the terrorist organizations with a global dimension targeted by the
coalition against terrorism. In this light, it would appear that there is a defacto agreement to the
distinction between terrorist groups and groups exercising either a national right of self-
determination or of self-defense (depending on the perspective adopted). The proposed tribunal
might build on this pragmatic consensus to develop a working definition of terrorism that would
command broad international support.
21. S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4370th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368
(2001).
22. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4385th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1371
(2001).
23. U.N. CHARTER ch. 7, arts. 39-51 (entitled "Action With Respect to Threats to the
Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression").
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* facilitate cooperation in intelligence-gathering, investigation, and
prevention, and the exchange of operational information between
states to track the movement of terrorist networks;
* address the links between international terrorism and transnational
crime, illicit drugs, money-laundering, illegal arms-trafficking and
illegal movements of weapons of mass destruction; and
* encourage all states to become parties to the relevant international
conventions for the prevention of terrorism in order to develop
coordinated mechanisms of prevention and punishment.
The claim that the attacks of September 1 1th transcend the capacities of
the United Nations, and international law more generally, suggests that neither
the organization nor the law is equipped to deal with crime by transnational or
non-state entities. However, it remains an undeniable fact of international life
that the system is organized around states as basic units and that even terrorist
networks have to operate in a system of state boundaries. In such a system,
any response to terrorism will also be organized around states, whether it be
legal or not. International law and international organizations enjoy the
distinct comparative advantage of being designed to facilitate inter-state
interaction and coordination, an advantage with which military strategy can
scarcely compete when faced with an enemy that is not organized militarily but
through transnational coordination.
The insight shared by those who adopt a legalist paradigm in response to
terrorism is that there can be no ad hoc or unilateral solution to terrorism. Nor
in the long run can there by a military solution. Terrorism as it emerged on
September 1 1th is a transnational phenomenon that requires a concerted,
consistent and coordinated international cooperative framework if there is to be
any chance of eliminating the threat. The only viable mechanisms available for
accomplishing integration and coordination of strategy are those of
international law and organization. Efforts to short-cut the development of an
international legal framework to cope with terrorism, in favor of military
coalitions and a binary division of states between good and evil, though
possibly more satisfying to some in the short-term, run the risk of aggravating
the very international divisions that can most easily be exploited to coordinate
further underground criminal and terrorist enterprise. Entrenching an us-and-
them paradigm is in tension with the need for coordination-it is both unlikely
to yield vital information in the short-run and less likely to yield international
security in the long run. A preferable alternative is to employ the resources
already in place within the boundaries of existing international law, and to
pursue constructive proposals on how to shift those boundaries outward.
These efforts, more than any military campaign, hold the long-term promise of
a more secure international system.
